By Allison Proffitt
November 19, 2026 | SAN FRANCISCO — Allan May has watched medical technology reinvent itself more than once. In a keynote at last week’s Neurotech Leaders Forum, the co-founder and chairman of the board at Life Science Angels walked the audience from the era when every intervention meant an operation to a moment when a wearable stimulator can challenge a blockbuster drug class, and closed with blunt advice for founders struggling to raise money.
“If you want to know what separates winners from losers, it’s perseverance. The winner doesn’t quit,” May said.
From Surgery to ‘Plumbing’
May began with a short history. “In the beginning there was surgery; there was only surgery,” he said, because physicians had no way to see inside the body without opening it. That changed with the first angioplasty in 1977, performed by Andreas Grüntzig, followed by the first U.S. procedure the next year. Early cases were brutally difficult, May said, requiring three or four people in the lab. The turning point, in his telling, was Stanford’s Paul Yock, founder of the university’s biodesign program, whose 1985 rapid exchange wire allowed a single operator to do the procedure. May called it “the thing that broke open the ability of cardio intervention to expand.”
Within a decade, interventional cardiology, radiology, and neurology had all taken off. “It was stunning to watch the birth of this stuff,” May said.
The enabling technology, he said, was “a humble little C-arm”: a mobile fluoroscopic imager. The leading machines came from OEC, a Warsaw, Indiana, company founded by German expatriate engineers who, May said, over-engineered the product. “It was a Mercedes in a Volkswagen world,” he said. Those extra capabilities, including long run times, made OEC’s machines suited to half-hour interventional procedures, and the company held roughly 70% of the global market for three decades against GE, Siemens, Philips, and Toshiba.
May was vice president of business development at OEC’s parent company, Diasonics, which acquired OEC in 1983. He recalled larger rivals periodically courting the company and, when talks failed, warning, “if we don’t buy you, we’re going to have to crush you in the marketplace.” OEC’s edge was focus. “We were selling one thing,” May said, while competitors’ salespeople preferred to sell million-and-a-half-dollar procedure rooms. “So it wasn’t a fair fight; we killed them.” The company was sold to GE in 1999 for $500 million.
Yet for roughly 20 years, May said, the interventional field was essentially mechanical: clearing blockages or fixing leaks. “This whole interventional thing was plumbing,” he said. The idea of altering the body’s electrical systems with implantables and wearables did not take hold until the 2000s.
Betting on Electrical Medicine
May founded Life Science Angels around 2005, as investors regained their appetite after the dot-com bust. He also started the venture firm Emergent Medical Partners and co-founded Nanostim, the first leadless implantable pacemaker, later sold to St. Jude.
The pacemaker company was, he said, nearly impossible to fund. Investors told him, “Don’t you understand that it’s a $4 billion market because we have them and they work.” His response: “you think in 50 years you’re still going to have them and they work?”
At the time, the dominant neurostimulation product was Medtronic’s spinal cord stimulator, which May described as “a hockey puck that was stuck in people’s back for lower spinal pain”: essentially a repurposed pacemaker that generated $300 million to $400 million a year with little competition until Nevro took about half its market share.
The Stimwave Story
Around 2009, May was introduced to Laura Perryman, an aerospace engineer pursuing a Ph.D. with an idea for transmitting power wirelessly to medical devices. He admitted his first reaction was skepticism: “that’s a typical tech person who totally doesn’t understand anything about med tech.”
Perryman’s concept implanted only the electrode and receiver, with the battery worn outside the body. May noted that early devices, including pacemakers, had started as wearables and been abandoned because “patients wanted a one and done.” But by the 2010s, he said, people had grown used to charging devices every night, and neurostimulation did not have to be life-sustaining. Perryman’s other insight was to target peripheral pain rather than compete with Medtronic and Nevro on spinal pain. “She nailed it,” May said.
About a decade in, the company, Stimwave, was generating some $40 million in revenue, heading toward $50 million, and receiving term sheets of $300 million to $400 million from major companies, according to May. It raised a Series D at a $150 million pre-money valuation; Life Science Angels and Emergent held shares from the A, B, and C rounds bought at under a dollar.
“Well, turns out that the company went bankrupt in one year, and Laura went to prison, and that was the end of that story,” May said.
For investors, he said, the lesson is sobering: his group made the right calls on technology and market and supported the company properly, only to find the CEO was committing fraud. It “just shows you how hard this is.” But Jim Cavouto, Neurotech Reports’ editor, drew a distinction between the two cases: “Elizabeth Holmes was making stuff up. Laura was an engineer, and she cut some corners and paid a price for it, but the technology was not bogus.” Cavouto noted that the technology lives on at Curonix, the company that took over from Stimwave.
Noctrix: ‘It Can Be Done’
May then turned to what he called a happier story: Noctrix, the restless legs syndrome company founded by Shriram Raghunathan, another Neurotech Leaders Forum speaker. “This was the surest I ever was that I could make money in an investment,” May said, and laid out why.
Raghunathan, a biodesign alumnus, had been an engineer designing stimulation waveforms, so engineering risk was low. The market was large and unserved: “Eight million people, and there were no device therapies, not a single device available.” Patients faced dopamine drugs and worse, and many with severe disease go without sleep several nights a week. “Anytime a device can take pharma head on, that’s a really interesting investment niche,” May said. And because the product was a simple wearable, efficacy could be tested quickly at sleep centers. “And he did, and it worked.”
The remaining work was form factor, regulatory strategy and, critically, reimbursement. When Life Science Angels invested, the plan was to use monitoring codes paying $50 per patient per month. The team instead spent a year and a half to two years qualifying the company as its own durable medical equipment provider, winning far higher reimbursement. “The gross margin is outrageous of that device,” May said.
The company was acquired for $320 million in cash roughly seven years after its founding, May said, during a tough financing climate. “Every one of his rounds was a 4X up round,” he said. “It can be done.” His takeaway: “no matter how tough it is out there, winners still win.”
May mentioned other neurotech investments, including companies in epilepsy and urology, before closing his formal remarks with BrainCo, a Chinese neurotech firm that has introduced a wearable brain stimulator to suppress appetite, effectively taking on GLP-1 drugs, with follow-on products planned for autism, ADHD, and insomnia. “Talk about potential for neurostim, wow,” he said. “I wish I was in the audience with you guys doing this again.”
Advice for Founders
Asked how investing in neuromodulation compares with cardiology, May said cardiology had an advantage because “cardiologists were the fastest adopters in the hospital” and were among hospitals’ biggest money-makers. Neurostimulation, and now brain-computer interfaces, are drawing similar excitement, he said, though “it pretty much took Elon Musk to light that one up.” Neurologists lack cardiologists’ institutional push, he said, but as the therapies have proven themselves, that gap may have largely closed.
One founder asked how to persuade venture capitalists who dismiss the idea of a device competing with entrenched drugs. Beyond perseverance, May pointed to a structural problem: “venture capitalists aren’t venture capitalists anymore.” Today’s VCs act like merchant bankers, he said. “They don’t want to fund risk.” He voiced their logic: “gee, it’s going to take 10 years, and my fund only lasts 10 years.”
His prescription: gather as much non-dilutive funding, such as grants, as possible before raising equity, then target angels, early-stage investors, small boutique venture funds and family offices, which he described as “the groups who have the patience to stay with you for these things and the vision to see where it is.”
Those investors still expect a rigorous business case, May warned. “They want to know how you’re going to make money,” he said. Roughly “one out of a hundred” pitches get funded by angels or VCs, and in his view that is largely because founders cannot explain their path to profit: go-to-market, margins, inflection points, cash needs, and the milestones that will justify a higher valuation in the next round. “If they pay the same amount of money, it crushes you because it’s a flat round, and it crushes the investor,” he said.
He was pointed about typical pitch decks: “27 slides on technology and clinical, and three slides on business case. That’s where you’re getting in trouble.”
The Family Office Puzzle
The final question came from a serial founder who said he had heard entrepreneurs refer to family-office investors as “benefactors.” May said he has long tried to bridge that world. “I’ve been trying to get family offices connected with angels in a formal way for 20 years. It is really, really hard,” he said.
He recalled organizing a med tech investment conference for family offices, with 30 in the room, only for one attendee to ask after the first panel how the family offices could contact one another. The sector is fragmented and opaque, May said, and family offices tend to invest deeply in a single disease area tied to personal experience, such as a relative lost to breast cancer, Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s, rather than across medtech broadly. That is changing, he said, but for now founders must be targeted. “You just need to rifle shot,” he said, seeking out the family offices focused on their specific vertical.



